By Callum Christie, Foreign Policy Specialist
This will be a series of articles concerning the issues of specific country’s foreign policy direction by 2050.
Russia must decide the future orientation of its foreign policy, with China rising and the West remaining but stagnating. By 2050, China will be the largest economy in the world, challenging the established, American-led world order. In theory, Russia should welcome the downgrading of a long-standing adversary. However, this creates a new world order which Russia must adapt to, in which it has 3 options.
The first is to directly align with China. This carries major risks as political allegiance would require economic openness and risk making Russia into a vassal state. In mainland Asia, China has used its economic power to redraw borders with Tajikistan, secured economic control of central Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative and has shown it will not contend with civilian dissent or elite indecision in Hong Kong. The Economist has referred to the One Belt, One Road Initiative as the Our Bulldozers, Our Rules initiative.
This could point to an assertive Beijing dealing with nations and regions it sees as its sphere of influence. Conversely, Russia is a different nation with its own trappings of power, therefore less easy to control and more deserving of respect. Although, to say there would be an imbalance of power would be an understatement. Another problem would be Xi’s insistence that modern Russia is what China should seek to avoid, with his insistence studying the fall of the Soviet Union.
While the West has long viewed a China-Russia alliance with horror, Moscow and Beijing have never particularly warmed to it. Dealing with China is seen as tomorrow’s problem in Russia; kleptocracy is not particularly good at planning for the future as corruption is more concerned with stealing today rather than planning for tomorrow.
The next option is for the EU and Russia to form some sort of alliance and or understanding, for Russia to be in the Western camp. On paper, Russia and the EU could be allies. Economically, Russia is the EU’s 5th biggest trading partner due to its proximity. Most Russians see themselves as European and Russia as part of Europe; Moscow and Saint Petersburg are great European cities with the culture and coffee shops to show. However, history and politics complicate this.
An accommodation would have to be reached with Ukraine over Crimea, Brussels over democracy and human rights along with the central issue of the expansion of a military alliance which Russia deems as a fundamental threat to its security. Considering Russia’s assassinations using chemical weapons throughout Europe, continuing war in the Donbass, and lack of action on human rights and corruption does not look promising.
It is exceedingly difficult to foresee a thawing of relations without a drastic change of policy in the Kremlin and without significant dialogue between Moscow and Brussels. The language of von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech was not compromising. A Russia-EU alliance would require significant change and compromise.
The third option is to try to be an independent power. In a multipolar world this could be possible; Russia has a large economy, nuclear arsenal, significant armed forces, and a seat on the UN Security Council. However, this option ignores Russia’s internal problems: an economy held back by corruption and dependent on hydrocarbons while internationally Russia lacks strong military allies. This option is just continuing the current trend, not changing with the times. This option is also heavily dependent on the development of the world system.
Overall, difficult decisions lie ahead for the Kremlin.
The first is to directly align with China. This carries major risks as political allegiance would require economic openness and risk making Russia into a vassal state. In mainland Asia, China has used its economic power to redraw borders with Tajikistan, secured economic control of central Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative and has shown it will not contend with civilian dissent or elite indecision in Hong Kong. The Economist has referred to the One Belt, One Road Initiative as the Our Bulldozers, Our Rules initiative.
This could point to an assertive Beijing dealing with nations and regions it sees as its sphere of influence. Conversely, Russia is a different nation with its own trappings of power, therefore less easy to control and more deserving of respect. Although, to say there would be an imbalance of power would be an understatement. Another problem would be Xi’s insistence that modern Russia is what China should seek to avoid, with his insistence studying the fall of the Soviet Union.
While the West has long viewed a China-Russia alliance with horror, Moscow and Beijing have never particularly warmed to it. Dealing with China is seen as tomorrow’s problem in Russia; kleptocracy is not particularly good at planning for the future as corruption is more concerned with stealing today rather than planning for tomorrow.
The next option is for the EU and Russia to form some sort of alliance and or understanding, for Russia to be in the Western camp. On paper, Russia and the EU could be allies. Economically, Russia is the EU’s 5th biggest trading partner due to its proximity. Most Russians see themselves as European and Russia as part of Europe; Moscow and Saint Petersburg are great European cities with the culture and coffee shops to show. However, history and politics complicate this.
An accommodation would have to be reached with Ukraine over Crimea, Brussels over democracy and human rights along with the central issue of the expansion of a military alliance which Russia deems as a fundamental threat to its security. Considering Russia’s assassinations using chemical weapons throughout Europe, continuing war in the Donbass, and lack of action on human rights and corruption does not look promising.
It is exceedingly difficult to foresee a thawing of relations without a drastic change of policy in the Kremlin and without significant dialogue between Moscow and Brussels. The language of von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech was not compromising. A Russia-EU alliance would require significant change and compromise.
The third option is to try to be an independent power. In a multipolar world this could be possible; Russia has a large economy, nuclear arsenal, significant armed forces, and a seat on the UN Security Council. However, this option ignores Russia’s internal problems: an economy held back by corruption and dependent on hydrocarbons while internationally Russia lacks strong military allies. This option is just continuing the current trend, not changing with the times. This option is also heavily dependent on the development of the world system.
Overall, difficult decisions lie ahead for the Kremlin.