Credit: Andrew Neel
It is unclear who fired the first shot and equally unclear who will fire the last. This is a long-standing and emotive conflict.
It has come at a bad time: COVID-19 has bled all goodwill in Europe, most capitals are far more concerned with the health, economic and social implications of COVID-19 than foreign policy.
When both nations were part of the Soviet Union, Moscow placed the Armenian-majority region of Nagorno-Karabakh within Soviet Azerbaijan.
This conflict has been simmering ever since. Both sides are drawing on nationalism after the failure of secret peace talks. Both sides have declared martial law and called up their reservists, with prolonged conflict looking likely.
This tension was suppressed for decades under the common proletariat identity of the USSR which collapsed so violently in the 1990s. Moscow arbitrarily redrawing borders within the USSR is one of the key causes of Ukrainian-Russia conflict over Crimea.
Azerbaijani President Aliyev’s rhetoric does not sound reconciliatory: “We are fighting on our own territories and we have the full right to restore territorial integrity of Azerbaijan that is recognised by all the states.” This is referring to the four 1993 UN Security Council resolutions which recognised Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian military forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
Why is the West not taking more of an interest? Because the West is rarely interested in the Caucasus’. Russia invaded Georgia and annexed South Ossetia in 2008, while the West looked on with only Sarkozy of France stepping in to restore peace.
Russian troops remain in these Russian-majority provinces today. Previously, the first, and second wars in Chechnya were met with only token resistance in the West. The second Chechen War waged brutally by the then newly elected President Putin which, after 9/11, was recast as part of the West’s war against Islamic terror despite all contrary evidence.
The geographical location of the conflict is also a problem. It is a region which claims to be European but is closer to Baghdad and Tehran than the Višegrad group capitals of Eastern Europe, let alone Western Europe.
It has also come at a bad time: COVID-19 has bled all goodwill in Europe, most capitals are far more concerned with the health, economic and social implications of COVID-19 than foreign policy. London has gone as far as to merge DfID into the Foreign Office, reducing its development commitments.
As November approaches, Washington focuses on their Presidential election which only a major foreign policy crisis can snap out of, due to this conflict’s distance and lack of American interests.
Biden is unlikely to attack Trump over this when there are much more developed lines of attack. It is unlikely Trump even knows where Azerbaijan, Armenia or the Caucasus’ are on a map and, considering his previous handling of foreign policy issues, is unlikely to grasp the complexity of the issue.
There is a Russia-Turkey rivalry at play, with Turkey strongly backing Azerbaijan and Russia backing Armenia, but also selling weapons to both, but this is an over-simplification.
Putin and Erdogan have a mutual respect due to their similar authoritarian instincts and practises.
This is also a conflict led by Azerbaijan and Armenia; Moscow does not want to have to deal with another conflict, with economic and COVID-19 problems domestically and conflicts abroad stacking up.
As the regional power with strong links with both sides, Moscow could play the role of peacemaker, giving Putin a much-needed foreign policy win. However, a long-term solution is needed which may require more specialist negotiators and mediators than Moscow can offer.
This conflict is yet another geopolitical example of the violent consequences of carelessly redrawing borders.
It has come at a bad time: COVID-19 has bled all goodwill in Europe, most capitals are far more concerned with the health, economic and social implications of COVID-19 than foreign policy.
When both nations were part of the Soviet Union, Moscow placed the Armenian-majority region of Nagorno-Karabakh within Soviet Azerbaijan.
This conflict has been simmering ever since. Both sides are drawing on nationalism after the failure of secret peace talks. Both sides have declared martial law and called up their reservists, with prolonged conflict looking likely.
This tension was suppressed for decades under the common proletariat identity of the USSR which collapsed so violently in the 1990s. Moscow arbitrarily redrawing borders within the USSR is one of the key causes of Ukrainian-Russia conflict over Crimea.
Azerbaijani President Aliyev’s rhetoric does not sound reconciliatory: “We are fighting on our own territories and we have the full right to restore territorial integrity of Azerbaijan that is recognised by all the states.” This is referring to the four 1993 UN Security Council resolutions which recognised Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian military forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
Why is the West not taking more of an interest? Because the West is rarely interested in the Caucasus’. Russia invaded Georgia and annexed South Ossetia in 2008, while the West looked on with only Sarkozy of France stepping in to restore peace.
Russian troops remain in these Russian-majority provinces today. Previously, the first, and second wars in Chechnya were met with only token resistance in the West. The second Chechen War waged brutally by the then newly elected President Putin which, after 9/11, was recast as part of the West’s war against Islamic terror despite all contrary evidence.
The geographical location of the conflict is also a problem. It is a region which claims to be European but is closer to Baghdad and Tehran than the Višegrad group capitals of Eastern Europe, let alone Western Europe.
It has also come at a bad time: COVID-19 has bled all goodwill in Europe, most capitals are far more concerned with the health, economic and social implications of COVID-19 than foreign policy. London has gone as far as to merge DfID into the Foreign Office, reducing its development commitments.
As November approaches, Washington focuses on their Presidential election which only a major foreign policy crisis can snap out of, due to this conflict’s distance and lack of American interests.
Biden is unlikely to attack Trump over this when there are much more developed lines of attack. It is unlikely Trump even knows where Azerbaijan, Armenia or the Caucasus’ are on a map and, considering his previous handling of foreign policy issues, is unlikely to grasp the complexity of the issue.
There is a Russia-Turkey rivalry at play, with Turkey strongly backing Azerbaijan and Russia backing Armenia, but also selling weapons to both, but this is an over-simplification.
Putin and Erdogan have a mutual respect due to their similar authoritarian instincts and practises.
This is also a conflict led by Azerbaijan and Armenia; Moscow does not want to have to deal with another conflict, with economic and COVID-19 problems domestically and conflicts abroad stacking up.
As the regional power with strong links with both sides, Moscow could play the role of peacemaker, giving Putin a much-needed foreign policy win. However, a long-term solution is needed which may require more specialist negotiators and mediators than Moscow can offer.
This conflict is yet another geopolitical example of the violent consequences of carelessly redrawing borders.
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